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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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The central argument of this chapter is that participatory budgeting and analysis - 
whether it is pro-poor, environment-sensitive or gender responsive - offers a new 
potentially innovative means for ensuring government accountability to international and 
national commitments as well as a more balanced distribution of public resources. 
 
With this argument in mind, the chapter begins with a consideration of the relationship of 
accountability to fiscal policy. Accountability is explored in terms of its legal, 
institutional and market dimensions.  This is followed by an analysis of budgets and 
accountability as they relate to four aspects that are of importance.  These are: a. 
comprehensiveness; b. institutional responsiveness; c. transparency; and, d. credibility of 
commitments.  Our next section outlines some justifications for one form of applied 
participatory budgeting-gender responsive budgeting.  This is a preamble to explaining 
what gender responsive budgets are, and how such budgets relate to the four aspects of 
accountability sketched earlier.  Our elements of accountability are then related to cases 
that might contribute to an inventory of best practice.  These examples are drawn from a 
variety of countries such as India, Mauritius, Tanzania and Mexico.  Also important are 
initiatives taken by multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and 
entities within the UN system such as UNIFEM.  The chapter ends with conclusions 
about lessons learned from these gender budget initiatives, how they might be applied to 
other participatory exercises and points to next steps.   
 
We begin with a focus on accountability of fiscal policy - in its wider context of 
macroeconomic policy.  Here we might initially note that there are at least two 
dimensions to questions of accountability with respect to macroeconomic policies in 
general, and budget policies in particular: those concerning existing commitments and 
those concerning the paradigms or frameworks for the making of economic policy.   
 
The first concerns the degree to which governments can be held accountable for 
commitments that they have actually made for example, in enacting budget laws or in 
support of expenditures to meet international treaties or other stated commitments.  For 
instance, many governments have committed themselves to providing a certain 
percentage of GDP in ODA, but in practice, rarely meet this commitment.  This may have 
adverse consequences for international efforts to alleviate poverty.  Here the issues 
concern how can governments be made to meet such commitments in a manner that is 
internationally accountable, ultimately to the needs of poor people?     3
 
The second set of issues concerning accountability go well beyond the former since they 
involve issues that relate to the dominant paradigm of economic development and the 
role of budgetary policies within that framework.  For instance, there has been increasing 
stress in national economic policies as well as those of the international financial 
institutions, on maximizing the opportunities available to market participants.  Smaller 
government and freer markets have meant that there is less justification for governments 
to provide direct transfers of resources to the poorer members of their societies, as well as 
from richer to poorer countries in the form of ODA.  In this way, taxation and 
expenditure regimes have been linked to market-enabling initiatives, rather than being 
based in more socially responsive programs that directly benefit poor women and men.   
 
There is some debate about whether more socially directed expenditures are more 
economically efficient than market-enabling policies.  However, one of the central 
arguments in favour of budgets that are more sensitive to matters of poverty and gender is 
that, especially in the poorest countries, they are likely to lead to more optimal as well as 
equitable economic outcomes. 
 
Important here is that the 1990s saw a wave of fiscal stabilization measures and laws, 
which signal a return to a pre-Keynesian orthodoxy.  Such a shift has implications for the 
changing structures of accountability for fiscal policy. 
 
With this in mind, this paper will outline the nature of the existing budgetary frameworks 
and how these can be made more consistent with the goals of greater equity as well as 
producing more economically efficient outcomes in developing countries.  It will 
therefore place the issues of participation and accountability in this wider framework and 
ask the question: accountability of what and to whom? 
 
This question will be pursued first by a discussion of dimensions of accountability within 
a consideration of existing budgetary frameworks.  The example of gender responsive 
budgeting is explored as one potential instrument of accountability for tying international 
commitments to national resources.  Gender analysis of government budgets also requires 
ministers and officials to look at government finances in a new way.  The conclusion 
focuses on the lessons learned about voice, accountability and governance from these 
initiatives and considers their more general applicability for other groups effectively 
disenfranchised from participating in the macroeconomic policy process.  
 
 
Issues of Accountability and Fiscal Policy 
 
The first issue to explore at a more general level of analysis is: to who is fiscal policy 
accountable?  Conventionally, the answer has been taxpayers but de facto, fiscal policy is 
accountable to all citizens who are current, former and future taxpayers (for example, 
seniors and children).  Secondly, fiscal policy is connected to an overall macroeconomic 
framework within which other economic activities must take place.  Hence, we have 
government accountability to market participants of two kinds: (a) a general and indirect   4
form of market accountability related to sustaining an “appropriate business climate” of 
concern to investors, businesses, currency traders, etc; (b) a second form of more direct 
and specific accountability of borrowers to lenders (creditors) -in short to all of the 
institutions which might fund budget deficits through loans. Countries of the South for 
instance, are directly constrained by the second more direct form of market 
accountability as creditors of the International Financial Institutions.  
 
This then raises the relationship between accountability and macroeconomic policy.  
Given these two layers of accountability: Who is involved in decisions about aggregate 
levels of spending, taxation and public debt?  What are the views of the economy of those 
who currently make these decisions?   A discussion of accountability needs to consider 
each of these dimensions and the degree to which they enable or constrain participatory 
budget initiatives such as gender responsive budgets. 
 
 
1. Accountability of the legal framework 
 
In most nations, a series of laws and rules, institutional practices and a framework of 
market-based expectations, connected to the mobilization of a large amount of financial 
resources, govern fiscal policy.  These laws have been enacted with specific goals and 
constituencies in mind (for example balanced budget laws).  Balanced budget laws and 
indeed, constitutional amendments,  introduce a specific set of numerical targets into the 
budget process, limiting for instance, the standard Keynesian anti-cyclical policy 
prescription of tax cuts, expenditure increases and deficits in recessions with tax 
increases and expenditure cuts and surplus during expansionary periods. Several critical 
points have been raised concerning the relationship between balanced budget laws and 
the alleviation of poverty.  First, balanced budget laws reflect a questioning of the 
feasibility of fiscal finetuning.  These statutes and laws are meant to institutionalise an 
era of limited government by constraining governments in their fiscal policy decisions by 
establishing caps in spending and taxation. In doing so, however, they serve to 
discourage proactive policies to promote equality of incomes since balanced-budget 
legislation, in particular, is likely to generate increased pressure for regressive spending 
cuts whenever revenues decline. In times of recession, the political costs of spending 
money to eradicate poverty or to address the human impacts of restructuring may be 
perceived as prohibitively high by politicians. Second, balanced-budget laws undermine 
the crucial role that government spending plays in stabilizing the economy during 
private-sector recessions. Without the ability to engage in counter-cyclical spending, 
governments will have to meet a fall in levels of demand through spending cuts, a 
strategy which might well postpone recovery (Phillipps 1996).  In sum, it can be argued 
that this aspect of balanced budget laws reveals an important political dimension, i.e., a 
bias in favour of limited government and against redistributive fiscal transfers. 
 
2. Accountability of institutions 
 
a. Domestic 
   5
At the present time, decision-making about fiscal policy is largely concentrated in the 
hands of finance ministries and central banks (who are said to have the requisite 
expertise).  Usually, elected representatives (as well as the poor) are “locked out” of the 
policy-making process, resulting in a “democratic deficit” concerning the making of the 
most fundamental economic policies.  Perhaps the best-known example of this is the new 
European Central Bank which is largely independent of parliamentary or popular 
influence and which has a mandate to pursue low-inflation policies.  The world-wide 
trend towards independent central banks has been reinforced by the widespread 
implementation of fiscal restraint legislation as well as the balanced budget laws noted 
above.  This means that there is no ability on the part of civil society to enforce 
accountability of fiscal policy, as well as monetary policy. 
 
 
Box 1: The Marginalised and the Monitoring of Budgets 
 
Unpacking of the budgetary information and analysis of budgetary allocation and 
performance is one of the most important steps towards making credible public argument 
and policy influencing.  This task has become all the more crucial in the context of the 
increasing instances of pro poor public policy rhetoric without the corollary budgetary 
commitments.  In the last eight years, the structural adjustment and liberalisation policies 
have further alienated the poor and the marginalised from the budget priorities.  Hence, 
there is an urgent need to demystify and monitor the budget from the perspective of the 
rights of marginalised sections. 
 






b. International  
 
Whilst price stability is a desirable goal, it should not necessarily be the only 
macroeconomic goal of central banks. Indeed, following the Great Depression of the 
1930s, most central banks were legislatively committed to balance both price stability 
and employment levels as a strategy to reduce the poverty and misery of large segments 
of their population. In the current context, if macroeconomic policy is contingent on an 
agreement being negotiated with the IMF for a stabilization loan then often many 
members of cabinet are “locked out” of the process.    Unequal representation in the 
policy formulation and institutional processes of economic governance gives more 
political weight to ‘technocrats’: that is neo-classical economists, financial administrators 
and central bankers, who may not be representative of broader societal interests.   They 
are often trained within the Washington Consensus orthodoxy that emphasizes a smaller, 
market-supporting role for government and greater freedom of markets.  Prior to 1997 
and the East Asia crisis, this group of decision-makers in government and the 
international financial institutions consistently favoured structural adjustment programs   6
and forms of macroeconomic stabilization that supported a greater role for private capital 
and private capital flows in development.  Since the Asian crisis, a compensatory form of 
this neo-liberal orthodoxy has emerged that stresses the social impact of macroeconomic 
policies, social safety nets for vulnerable groups,  and links excessive fiscal restraint to 
“knock-on effects’ which may lead to greater social, economic and political insecurity.  
As the Commonwealth Secretariat notes, “There is also an increasing recognition that 
growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the elimination of poverty, as the 
distribution of resources in a society has a crucial bearing on the manner in which growth 
impacts on poverty.”(Sept. 2001)  
 
 
3. Market Accountability 
 
Despite these concessions to social considerations, the overall framework of 
macroeconomic policy remains one driven by structures of accountability that reflect the 
needs of capital markets, the “three Cs” of credibility, consistency and confidence (Gill, 
1998).  Similarly, the low inflation bias emerging through liberalized financial markets 
(high interest rates, tight monetary polices, fiscal restraint) reflects the ability of financial 
institutions and investors to exercise direct voice over macroeconomic policies precisely 
because of the fear that they might decide to postpone or cancel investments or else, 
exercise their exit option of capital flight which may result in a balance of payments 
crisis and worsen external indebtedness.   Indeed, the Third World debt crisis has been 
made less manageable because investors in countries such as Mexico and Argentina have 
been able to exercise this exit option when they perceive deterioration in the investment 
climate.  By contrast the poor, at best, have only voice since they tend to be place bound 
and hemmed in by unresponsive domestic structures and a restrictive international 
migration and refugee regime. In this sense, macroeconomic decisions can constrain the 
room for maneuver in changing budgets in a more pro-poor and gender equitable 
direction (Elson, 2001). 
 
 
Box 2: Democratizing Macroeconomic Decision-making 
 
The desire to make budgets more participatory and transparent is part of a larger agenda 
to ‘democratize’ the formulation of macroeconomic policy frameworks.  The design of 
macroeconomic frameworks and policies which take into account the voices and interests 
of women and poor people is critical in the fight against gender inequality and poverty.  
Macroeconomic policy-making often remains sheltered from broad public scrutiny and 
debate.  This is due in part to the belief that macroeconomics is both a natural subject, 
devoid of social content, and a technical subject best left to experts.  However, the 
technical content of macroeconomic policies often disguises their social content, these 
policies are enacted without a context of institutional structures and power relations 
among economically differentiated social groups.  Macroeconomic policies also produce 
a variety of social outcomes by determining which groups get what out of the economic 
pie.  Scrutinizing public budgets is an important step towards understanding the social   7
content of macroeconomic policies currently in place and democratizing the process of 
macroeconomic policy-making. 
 





Budgets and Accountability 
 
Accountability is an aspect of governance that involves power and authority relationships 
(of governors to governed), transparency (the ability to inspect and establish the 
truthfulness of claims) and the credibility of policies over time (a government's intentions 
and action with regard to policy must be believed by its constituents or the market 
players).  Accountability involves issues that are both short and long-term and these can 
be considered with respect to their (i) comprehensiveness; (ii) issues of institutional 
responsiveness to, for example, the needs of different constituencies, or systems of 
checks and balances, public hearings; (iii) issues of transparency; and finally (iv) the 
ability on the part of citizens to judge the credibility of commitments in the making of 




The issue of comprehensiveness relates to macro-economic policies of governments as a 
whole, the ways that they are made, and the degree to which different constituents or 
stakeholders are included in the making and implementation of budgetary policies.   
 
In most OECD countries, after World War II, corporatist arrangements were made to 
involve representatives of the business community, as well as from trade unions in 
creating the broad economic frameworks in which governments would seek to operate.  
Since the 1970s, however, trade unions have been less and less influential in contributing 
to the frameworks for economic policy, not only in the OECD but world wide.  More to 
the point, there is little evidence that for much of the last fifty years policy-making 
frameworks have been open to significant inputs from the poor, although this is slowly 
changing.  So one aspect of comprehensiveness involves the degree to which the policy 
process is open, inclusive and transparent.   
 
Within this context, budgetary policies must be comprehensively defined so that all 
aspects of government expenditures and income (including) taxation are placed on the 
table for consideration by the various stakeholders.  This would also include off balance 
sheet items (for example funds for military and police expenditures that are kept from 
scrutiny); other income from overseas sources, including loans from the international 
financial institutions. For this to be possible presupposes an institutional and political 
framework that is responsive to popular needs, as well as transparency, so that decisions 
can be debated on the basis of timely, useful and accurate information.  Indeed, such 
criteria underpin various initiatives throughout the world to mobilize support for   8




Box 3:  Information Gaps 
 
Even if we have all the information on how much does it cost to provide free breakfast to 
100 communities, if we don’t have the data on how many breakfasts are being served in 
the community how could we pinpoint an inefficient expenditure? 
 
The Challenges of a Participative Budget Process in Peru, Eduardo Moron and Claudia 
Gonzales del Valle IBP Website 
 
Thus budgets must include all fiscal operations of government as the inaccurate 
measurement of the fiscal position, combined with a weak budget process, can affect 
poverty alleviation programs and social spending severely (Falk, 2000).  This can be very 
important for the implementation stage of the budget.  For example, the Center for 
Budget and Policy Studies in Bangalore, India (CBPS@vsnl.com) has produced an 
analysis between planned and actual expenditures.  Uganda in 1998 established a Poverty 
Action Fund (PAF) to act as a mechanism to target, protect and monitor funds released 
by the HIPC initiative and donors for poverty programs (Krafchik, 2001).  This PAF does 
not operate as an extra-budgetary fund but has been incorporated into the total budget. 
 
2.  Institutional Responsiveness 
 
Institutional responsiveness relates to the degree to which the different organs of 
government that are involved in the making of budgetary policies are amenable to inputs 
from the various stakeholders in society.   
 
The way this is normally understood in the economic literature is as follows.  Some 
countries have the responsibility and authority for fiscal policy heavily concentrated in 
the finance ministry which dominates other ministries in the budgetary process 
(“hierarchical” processes).  Other nations have a more “collegial” process which is led 
but not necessarily dominated by the Finance Ministry.  All things being equal, the more 
collegial the framework, the more likely it will be amenable to inputs from a different 
constituencies, although many economists have argued that fiscal restraint becomes much 
more difficult under collegial systems (Alesina and Perotti, 1996).   
 
Nevertheless, as the World Bank (1997) has pointed out, other institutional arrangements 
are important, for example the division of authority between the legislative and executive 
branches of government, and ultimately, the judiciary with policies subject to judicial 
review.  In the United States for example, Congress has the power of the purse and enacts 
legislation which authorizes expenditures.  The President, on the other hand, needs to 
sign expenditure bills into law, and it is generally the executive branch that actually 
spends the money to fund government operations as well as to inject resources into the 
economy.  Moreover, the process of  budgetary politics in Washington is premised upon   9
open debates and the provision of timely and detailed information to citizens and market 
participants.  Indeed, any provisions that are challenged in the courts can ultimately be 
struck down by the Supreme Court if they are found to be unconstitutional.  
 
Moreover, the systems of checks and balances are also reinforced with accounting and 
audit mechanisms that buttress transparency.  A range of checks and balances including 
the provision of impartial information and more transparent decision making are 
hallmarks of a strong budget process (e.g. the U.S. Congressional Budget Office and 
Auditor Generals in many other systems - systems that the USA and the international 
financial institutions  have recommended for many developing nations).   
 
Nevertheless, even if an institutional system is accountable in this way it may not result 
in budgetary allocations which are responsive to the needs of the poor, or indeed 
economically effective use of public funds, particularly if the system can be captured by 
"special interests".  In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon on September 11th 2001 for example, there was a collapse in the US 
airline and tourist industry and in consumer confidence more generally.  Thus in late  
October 2001, emergency budget legislation is being debated in Congress that would  
provide substantial tax cuts and tax rebates to the wealthy and to large corporations - 
who, it was pointed out by the New York Times (Sat. Oct. 27, 2001)-  had little incentive 
to invest because of excess capacity and falling demand.  Many leading economists in the 
United States such as Paul Krugman and Allan Blinder had argued that tax cuts should 
have been focused on the poor and unemployed, since they would likely have spent the 
funds and thus prop up sagging consumption and effective demand, mitigating the 
economic recession. 
 
This is why  institutional arrangements that involve partnering with civil society 
organisations that have expertise and adequate resources to offer monitoring and 
evaluation of budgets may not only be a means of increasing accountability but also 
perhaps a way to ensure more economically sound budgeting in an institutional 
arrangement that is less prone to “capture”.    
 
In Croatia for instance, the Institute for Public Finance has recently provided the first 
guide to the Croatian budget and offers the first opportunity for independent oversight 
and participation (Krafchik, 2001).  Local participatory auditing in Kerala, India offers a 
novel example of civil society oversight and participatory auditing techniques.  In this 
case, the local auditor meets with village members to physically audit the outputs planned 
and approved through the local budget (Goetz and Jenkins cited in Krafchik).  In Mexico, 
a pro-poor budget review by FUNDAR was instrumental in the creation of a government 
commission for the control and monitoring of public resources.  
 
3.  Transparency 
 
The issue of transparency is key to discussions about budgets and this issue involves the 
question: transparency of what and for whom?  This is because there has been an 
asymmetrical focus on the transparency of governments and correspondingly less   10
attention to the need for transparency of lenders and investors as well as for private 
banking operations more generally.  This issue has recently been the focus of 
considerable public attention after September 11th, 2001, with scrutiny of private 
banking and offshore arrangements used by terrorists.  It is worth noting however that 
this concern has also highlighted how offshore centres and bank secrecy are a means of 
exit as well as tax avoidance for investors.  
 
Thus for reasons of public interest as well as economic security, an important 
contribution to the discussion of enhancing voice and accountability for poor people then 
is to re-balance discussions of transparency to include firms, lenders and other private 
actors.  As UNIFEM notes in its Progress of the World’s Women (2000):  “There is an 
emphasis on promoting partnerships with the private sector, but there is hardly any 
reference to regulating the private sector, particularly corporations, and holding them 
accountable to social development goals and human rights standards.  Indeed the only 
action specified is for national and international NGOS to establish monitoring 
mechanisms aimed at promoting accountability of the private sector.” (59)  More 
broadly, the issue is that the logic of IMF and Wall Street transparency as outlined in the 
IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies 
(adopted by the Interim Committee on Septem.ber 26, 1999) puts the onus on borrowers 
to provide information, wants transparency of governments whilst avoiding regulation of 
capital and international finance.   Thus much needs to be done to unravel the webs of 
unaccountable offshore finance and to prevent their use by those seeking to avoid taxes - 
in ways that go well beyond the regulation of money laundering.   
 
In other words, a credible budget framework requires transparency not just of  
governments and borrowers, but also lenders.  Greater budget transparency can help to 
identify the weaknesses and strengths of policies, can increase the legitimacy of 
governments and can create broader social alliances around difficult policy trade-offs - 
for example the trade-off between security and economic efficiency.  In developing 
countries, a transparent budget process also facilitates monitoring and evaluation of 
program support by donors.    
 
A prerequisite for transparency in budget systems is access to information.  However, as 
the Peruvian participatory budget experience reveals, “a lot of information is not the 
same as transparent information.”(Moron and Gonzales del Valle, 2000).  In the case of 
Peru, the Executive of the national government has recently fostered budget transparency 
by setting up an Internet portal that carries very detailed daily budget activities.  
However, the data is very cumbersome, difficult to unpack and does not necessarily give 
all of the information of interest to civil society groups wishing to monitor the process.   
 
A complementary approach is the one undertaken by the International Budget Project and 
Idasa in South Africa.  They have designed a survey of budget transparency and 
participation in the budget process that is currently being applied in four African 
countries -Ghana, Brazil, Nigeria and Zambia- and five Latin American countries - 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru (see www.international budget.org and 
www.idasa.org.za).     11
 
 
4.  Towards credibility of commitments 
 
The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest among broader sections of the 
population in public expenditure management, budgets and the role of the State in 
developed, transition and developing economies.  A flurry of publications and 
international meetings of governmental and civil society groups have marked this 
process.  For instance, the first international meeting of budget groups, convened by the 
International Budget Project in 1997 was attended by 50 representatives of budget 
organizations in 14 developing countries.  By 2000, there were 100 participants from 25 
countries (Krafchik, 2001).  The OECD has recently launched a new journal (title here) 
reflecting the increased interest in the subject.  Multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank and UNDP have organized a series of workshops on public expenditure 
management, people-centred budgeting and good governance.  And, a series of 
participatory budget initiatives have taken root in a variety of countries from South 
Africa to Peru, Tanzania, India, Croatia, Indonesia, Switzerland, Bangladesh, the United 
Kingdom and the Philippines. 
 
Why this interest?  The concern with public expenditure management and budgets 
reflects a wider concern with the role of the State both in developed and developing 
countries.  Since the 1980s, the international community has been involved in a re-
evaluation of the role of states and markets in the process of governance (see HDR 1999).   
Governance is a multi-faceted political process that involves both the public and the 
private sector in the determination of social and economic outcomes. The new context for 
governance is an era of greater economic liberalization than that associated with the 
period 1950-73 when statist development paradigms were more widespread. 
 
The interest in independent, applied budget work  is a recognition of the importance of 
budgets as both technical and political documents.  The growth of independent budget 
work is also a product of international developments such as democratization in societies 
as diverse as South Africa, Russia and Uganda which focuses on transparency and 
accountability (Krafchik, 2001)..  Applied budget analysis - whether it is pro-poor, 
environment-sensitive or gender responsive - offers a new tool for ensuring government 
accountability to international and national commitments as well as a balanced 
distribution of public resources.  
 
Gender responsive budget initiatives have begun to focus on the relationship between 
accountability and macroeconomic policies.  In Latin America, UNIFEM has promoted 
several budget reviews.  For example, a regionwide network, the People’s Education 
Network Among Women (Red de Educacion Popular entre Mujeres ( REPEM) is 
reviewing the framework of MERCOSUR to enhance the capacity of women to make 
macroeconomic proposals and resolutions that will promote greater gender equality 
(Vargas-Valente, 2001).  The Canadian Alternative Federal Budget, a collaborative 
project of civil society organizations, is another more developed example of linking 
participatory budgets to overall macroeconomic planning.  The Alternative Budget   12
produces a comprehensive parallel budget to that of the government linking it to a 
medium-term macroeconomic framework (see www.policyalternatives.ca) 
 
Nonetheless, as the above indicates, there is much that needs to be done by both 
governments and the private sector to indicate their commitment to budgetary processes 
that will be viewed as credible to the full range of stakeholders in society.  Rhetorical 
commitments to greater sensitivity to the interests of the poor and to gender equity need 
to be reinforced with binding commitments - for example commitments that have the 
force of law.  This requires not only that governments actually live up to their stated 
commitments but also that they rethink and reallocate their budgetary priorities.  As we 
shall see, there is a great deal of new thinking on budgetary questions that can form the 




Why Gender Responsive Budgeting? 
 
Gender responsive budget initiatives are increasingly recognized as an important tool for 
analyzing the gap between expressed commitments by governments and the decision-
making processes involved in how governments raise and spend money.  Gender 
responsive budgets share with other participatory budget initiatives the goals of 
developing an inclusive budget process, with independent oversight and a commitment to 
pro-poor and equity choices within existing fiscal capabilities.  In this sense, gender 
responsive budgeting shares with other participatory initiatives, the goal of 
widening governance and accountability structures by giving voice to those 
previously marginalized from fiscal policy decision-making.    
 
The 1990s saw the emergence of an international consensus on poverty eradication and 
the promotion of gender equality through such policy commitments as the 1995 World 
Social Summit on Development (WSSD), The Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing (FWCW) and the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD).  Signatory countries made commitments to integrate the goals of these 
conferences into their development plans (Box 4 here- p.51 of Progress Report).  This 
included mobilizing resources and ensuring transparency and accountability in budget 
processes as well as the monitoring of progress toward these goals (see Box 5 from 
Progress, p.112).   However, a number of significant shortfalls and inconsistencies in 
meeting these targets were identified in the five-year reviews in 1999 and 2000 of the UN 
Fourth World Conference on Women, the World Summit on Social Development and the 
International Conference on Population and Development.   
 
A key weakness of such initiatives, however, has been the absence of clear targets and 
strategies, as well as monitoring mechanisms and accountability measures (UNDP, 
2000).  A related obstacle has been the inadequate allocation and, ineffective and 
inequitable use of public resources.  In some countries, this can be linked to inadequate 
transparency and accountability of government to its citizens.  For instance, resources 
may be allocated to poverty reduction but may never reach poor people.  In other cases,   13
international development targets do not emphasize the economic, political and social 
empowerment of women.  As UNIFEM notes, these targets would be more useful if 
action were taken to: 
 
_  Include the objective of reducing women’s poverty and economic inequality; 
_  Widen the range of targets for progress towards gender equality to include progress in 
reducing the gender gap in decision-making; 
_  Interpret the targets, and strategies to achieve them, in the light of human rights 
obligations; 
_  Link the process of monitoring and evaluation of progress in reaching targets to the 
monitoring and evaluation of progress in implementing the Platform of Action; 
_  Press for participatory monitoring and evaluation at the country level, making use of 
qualitative as well as quantitative indicators, to relay women’s experiences from the 
village, or township or city neighborhood to national and international policy arenas 
(UNIFEM, 2000). 
 
International commitments such as those outlined in Box 5 are of course valuable in 
recognizing structural inequalities.  However, as discussed in the introduction, the 
concentration of macroeconomic policy in the hands of central banks, finance and 
multilateral or bilateral donor agreements often ‘locks out’ elected representatives from 
key aspects of macroeconomic decision-making thus rendering them ultimately, less 
accountable to poor people and women for these very international development 
commitments.   
 
In response, women have developed an applied gender analysis of government budgets.  
Gender responsive budgets are seen as one mechanism for:  
 
1.  Monitoring and widening the targets for gender-equity principles and social 
development; and  
2.  Broadening notions of accountability and transparency to include the gender impacts 





Box  6: Why Do We Need Gender Responsive Budgets? 
 
Budgets can impact differently on women and men, and different groups of women and 
men, through the provision of government goods and services, public sector employment 
opportunities, income transfers and the raising of taxation revenues as well as through 
their influence on the macroeconomic aggregates of output, employment, prices, 
investment and demand.  By asking questions about the direct and indirect impacts and 
the equity and efficiency outcomes of government budgets on women and men, women's 
budgets force re-evaluation of a long held assumption that government budgets and 
economic policies generally are ‘gender neutral’ in their impact.   14
 
Rhonda Sharp, Associate Professor (Australia), 1999 
 
A major shortcoming in most African countries is that the budget process is highly 
secretive, crafted mostly by government bureaucrats in the ministries of finance and 
planning the budget process is also gender blind, focusing more on the formal sector and 
marginalising millions of informal sector operatives who are largely female.  Increasingly 
the clamour for good governance, transparency and accountability to the citizenry/civil 
society has forced many governments to search for new ways of formulating national 
budgets. 
 
Thoko Ruzvidzo, Kwnanele Ona Jirira, Thresesa Moyo, Gender and Economic Reform in 
Africa Program/Zimbabwe team, (Zimbabwe), 1999 
 
Many countries are currently developing and implementing comprehensive strategies 
with the objective of eliminating absolute poverty and reducing relative poverty.  Many 
of these countries are also in the process of implementing public sector reforms, and 
improving macroeconomic management.  Incorporation of gender sensitivity in the 
national budget would be consistent with these initiatives and could be done with 
marginal additional efforts and resources. 
 
Kelvin Dalrymple, Ministry of Finance and economic Affairs (Barbados), 1999 
 
Without gender analysis of the budget there is inefficient use of resources, poor targeting, 
and malinvestment, with deliberate destruction by men of women’s access to land titles, 
credit, knowledge, extension services, appropriate technology and a wide range of 
services, all of which hinder a nation’s development and its growth statistics.  And all the 
above accumulatively contribute to the inter-generational costs incurred through poor 
nutrition, overpopulation and poverty.   
 
Marilyn Waring, Associate Professor (New Zealand) 
 
Mission Statements should take into account national and international law which our 
countries have subscribed to; each country should also have a unit to deal with 
implementation of a gender perspective in all policies and planning, and not just budgets.  
I am saying that because I am also aware that it is not in every country that there is such a 
unit. Martha Karua, M.P.  (Kenya) 
 
Regional Seminar for English-Speaking African Parliaments, 22-24 May, 2000, Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
 
Gender responsive budget initiatives provide a means for ensuring greater 
consistency between economic goals and social commitments. According to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat - a coordinator of such initiatives in Barbados, Fiji Islands, 
St.Kitts and Nevis, South Africa and Sri Lanka : “Gender responsiveness is essential to 
the key features of good governance: transparency, accountability and participation.    15
The analysis of gender issues, the participation of women as well as men in decision-
making processes at all levels, the recognition by institutions of women’s rights and 
needs, are all central to good governance and are strong features in Gender Responsive 
Budget Initiatives.” (2001)  
 
A number of interlinked justifications make gender budgets compelling: 
 
_  Gender responsive budget initiatives can improve budgetary performance and 
optimize the use of limited resources (efficiency gains). Improved targeting through 
gender analysis of budgets can avoid ‘false economies’ which refer to “attempts to 
reduce or contain financial costs in one sector may transfer or perpetual actual costs 
in terms of time-use for individuals and groups, and lower their overall productivity 
(Elson, 2000).”  Gender budget analysis also opens the door to evaluating work 
beyond the paid sector of the economy to the unpaid provision of care undertaken in 
communities and households. 
 
 
_  Gender responsive budget initiatives require accurate information and data that is 
gender-disaggregated to monitor and encourage public expenditure accountability.  In 
this sense, GSB contribute to a more open relationship between government and civil 
society.  Such initiatives also provide a monitoring tool and framework for comparing 
the developmental achievements of governments with their public resources.  This is 
part of a broader effort to link macroeconomic policies with social policies that target 




What are Gender Responsive Budgets? 
 
Gender responsive budget initiatives are not separate budgets for women and girls; 
rather, they are an attempt to analyze public money through the lens of gender.  Gender 
budgets are attempts to break down national or local budgets according to their impact on 
women and men, boys and girls.   The key questions according to Diane Elson, a 
development economist and one of the pioneers of such initiatives, is: what impact does 
this fiscal measure have on gender equality?  Does it reduce gender inequality; 
increase it; or leave it unchanged (Elson, 2001)?  
 
Who participates in these initiatives, what is scrutinized and how results are reported 
varies widely across countries.  Some are sponsored by governments, others by groups 
within civil society.  Some have been supported by international institutions.  For 
instance, the Commonwealth Secretariat has engaged in a partnership with ministries of 
finance and ministries of women’s affairs to develop a gender budget initiative.  
UNIFEM has sponsored a series of workshops and provided technical support toward 
gender-sensitive budget initiatives in Latin America, Africa and the Indian Ocean states.  
A June 1999 Workshop on Pro-Poor, Gender- and Environment Sensitive Budgets - 
organized by UNIFEM and UNDP - brought together international practitioners and   16
those inside and outside government interested in participatory budget initiatives (www. 
undp.org/poverty/events/wkshop/budgets.htm).  More recently, UNIFEM has worked 
with IDRC, the Belgian government, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the OECD to 
host a two-day meeting on gender budget initiatives (see Box 7).  This meeting signals a 
commitment to engage in gender responsive budget analysis in all countries by 2015.  
  
 
Box 7: Towards Gender Responsive Budgeting – A High Level Conference  
 
The Government of Belgium host a High Level conference in Brussels on 16-17 October 
2001 sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
supported by the Nordic Council of Ministers, the government of Italy, the United 
Nations Development Fund for Women, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the 
International Development Research Center-Canada.  This conference brought together 
ministers of budget, finance, employment, industry, gender, social affairs, transport, 
development cooperation, and agriculture, as well as experts and other international 
institutions.  The goal of this meeting was to mobilize political and financial support to 
strengthen the capacity of governments as well as civil society organizations to carry out 
these initiatives as well as to support the global vision of gender responsive budget 
initiatives in all countries by 2015.  Gender responsive budgeting, according to the 
conference communiqué, “can enable governments, that are parties to the convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against women, to better fulfil their obligations 
therein.  It is a means to reduce discrimination, direct or indirect, against women in 
policies governing taxation and expenditure.  It is also a means to ensure that the 
requisite resources are taken into account and made available to implement legislation 
that advances gender equality and the fulfillment of the human rights of women.” 
 
Conference Communiqué, Towards Gender-Responsive Budgeting: Strengthening 
economic and financial governance through gender responsive budgeting, 17 October 
2001, Brussels.  See www.unifem.org/gender_budgets/communique.html 
 
 
Gender budget initiatives are largely monitoring and auditing exercises that provide 
feedback to governments on policies and can provide a vehicle for greater transparency 
and accountability for those outside government (Budlender, 2000).  Most gender 
responsive budget initiatives focus on the spending side of local or national budgets.  
Some, such as the Philippines, only examine expenditures targeted specifically at women.  
At the moment, few initiatives have undertaken a concerted effort to analyze the revenue 
side of the budget.  However, the ‘how to’ of gender budget analysis is the same for both 
revenues and expenditures.  The goal is to categorize types of spending and revenues and 
then, through a series of tools that have been developed by Rhonda Sharp in Australia, 
Debbie Budlender in South Africa, and Diane Elson in the U.K. in conjunction with other 
researchers and activists, to assess these categories from a gender perspective.  Box 8 
(pp.116-118)  from UNIFEM's Biennial Report, Progress of the World’s Women (2000), 
provides a concise overview of both the categories and tools of analysis that have been   17
developed to carry out gender responsive budget initiatives.  Most applied gender budget 
initiatives begin with dividing public expenditures into three categories: 
 
Category 1: specifically targeted expenditures by government departments and 
authorities to women or men in the community intended to meet their particular needs. 
Category 2: equal employment opportunity expenditure by government agencies on their 
employees. 
Category 3: general or mainstream budget expenditures by government agencies which 
make goods or services available to the whole community but which are assessed for the 
gender impact. (See Box 8)   
 
Gender Responsive Budget Initiatives and Accountability  
 
With over 40 initiatives underway in most regions of the globe, there is now a mounting 
wealth of information, innovation and lessons learned.  However, the fact that each of 
these initiatives are embedded in different societies – with their own cultural, economic 
and political legacies – needs to be kept in mind.  In some contexts, the goals of gender 
responsive budget initiatives are to influence public policies directly; in other cases, these 
initiatives are aimed at mobilizing and sustaining broader political movements intent on 
structural change.  In some cases, globalization is creating a situation where the national 
level is the key political site for realizing participatory initiatives; in other contexts, 
globalization is fostering the local level as a key site for pro-poor and gender-responsive 
initiatives.   
 
Accountability is a key aspect motivating such initiatives.  As we noted earlier, 
accountability is an important aspect of governance involving power and authority 
relationships of governors to the governed.  Other components of accountability are 
the ability to inspect and establish the truthfulness of claims (transparency) as well 
as the credibility of government policies over time.  Women, particularly the poorest 
women in a society, are often at the margins of economic governance and decision-
making about fiscal policy.  Gender responsive budgets were developed as a tool for 
inserting women’s voices into discussions of taxation, spending and debt to underscore 
that budgets are not gender neutral in their policy impact since men and women occupy 
different social and economic positions.  
 
This section will offer a number of examples of gender responsive budget initiatives and 
link these to aspects of accountability discussed in the earlier part of the paper.  
 
1.  Comprehensiveness and Institutional Responsiveness 
 
Comprehensiveness relates to the degree to which differently constituencies and 
stakeholders in a society are included in the making and implementation of budgetary 
policies.  Applied gender budget analysis has provided an opportunity to inject women’s 
voices at the highest levels of government decision-making such as Ministers of Finance, 
as well as at the level of households and local communities.  However, applied gender 
budget analysis is not simply a technical exercise but a more long-term process that   18
requires government officials to think about the economy in new ways that include 
the unpaid sector where much of women’s time and efforts are concentrated.   
 
An examination of the extent to which women participate in budget decision-making is 
an important first step to greater accountability.  For instance, the Tanzania Gender 
Network Programme (TGNP) has undertaken a gender budget initiative which noted 
that, “…the planning and budgeting processes were found to be top-down, non-
participatory, and having male domination at the policy and decision making and 
technical level positions, instilled a biased outlook towards men’s and largely excluding 
women’s needs and aspirations for the development agenda.”   The Commonwealth 
Secretariat’s Gender Budget Initiative, agreed upon at the 1996 meeting of 
Commonwealth Ministers Responsible for Women’s Affairs, is one prominent example 
of an attempt to make governments more accountable to a wide variety of stakeholders.  
It strives to bring together government actors such as Ministers of Finance and Women’s 
Affairs, who might not otherwise work together.  This initiative builds on the lessons 
learned from the pioneering gender budget initiative launched inside the Australian 
government machinery in 1984 (see Box 9).   
 
 
Box 9: Lessons Learned from the Gender Budgets Pioneer- Australia   
 
Four core features of the Australian women’s budget model can be identified.  These 
features underpinned both its success and its limitations.  Firstly, these federal and state 
women’s budgets exercises became integral to the activities of the women’s policy 
machinery established within government bureaucracies at the various levels from the 
early 1970s.  Secondly, the exercises were constructed in the format of providing a 
comprehensive audit of the impact of government expenditure programs on women and 
girls.  Thirdly, they were firmly linked to the mainstream budgetary process and 
budgetary policy and were intended to provide a means for extending women’s influence 
over the sphere of economic policy.  Finally, although introduced by social democratic 
governments with the intentions of advancing the status of women, they were invariably 
dominated by bureaucratic or ‘mandarin’ politics with groups outside of government only 
having a minor influence… 
Women’s budgets have generated a number of innovative ways to develop a more 
meaningful accountability process within agencies, which linked official policy with 
effective resource allocations and actual outcomes.  For example, for a period the South 
Australian women’s budget required government departments to develop their own 
internal indicators of progressive changes.  Those women’s budgets still in existence 
have developed other useful accountability processes in relation to particular pollicies.  
These include monitoring the representation of women on government boards and 
committees and developing indicators of government achievements in meeting women’s 
needs as customers. . 
Unfortunately, the election of reformist governments and the emergence of women’s 
budgets in Australia both coincided with the end of the long boom and the demise of both 
fordism and the Keynesian welfare state.  The successful contestation for state power and 
influence which had been possible in the period of economic growth and stability rapidly   19
ended as the Australian economy entered a period of profound economic and political 
restructuring. 
 
Rhonda Sharp and Ray Broomhill, Australia's Role in the Development of Gender-
Sensitive Budgets, Presented at the UNDP/UNIFEM Workshop on Pro-Poor, Gender- 
and Environment-Sensitive Budgets, 28-30 June, 1999,  New York. 
 
 
The Australian Women’s Budget clearly illustrates the limitations of such an initiative in 
a non-expansionary economic climate.  The closure of those spaces within government 
where economic policies can be contested points to the importance of maintaining both 
inside and outside government exercises.  The Australian initiative also highlights the 
importance of having the commitment of Ministries of Finance to such a process.  The 
Commonwealth Secretariat’s initiative aims to overcome some of the structural 
limitations of the Australian exercise and to bring gender-equality advocates directly in 
contact with key economic ministries and officials. 
 
Box 10: The Commonwealth Secretariat Gender Budget Initiative 
 
One of the features of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s gender responsive budget 
initiative is the direct engagement and coordination of the programme by the Ministry of 
Finance (incorporating the budget department).  The Commonwealth Secretariat’s gender 
responsive budget initiatives in Barbados, the Fiji Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka and 
St.Kitts and Nevis, were led by Ministers of Finance, which provided the most strategic 
way forward for the following reasons: 
_  The Ministry of Finance has the requisite technical expertise to implement this 
process within the government. 
_  For the gender responsive budget initative to be effective it has to be implemented 
within the context of the annual budget cycle. 
_  Within a framework of gender mainstreaming, the ministry/department responsible 
for the programme area, in this case the budget office, is encouraged to take the lead 
on the implementation of the programme. 
…While the Ministry of Finance is best placed currently to implement the gender 
responsive budget initiative, its staff very often regard gender issues as the remit of social 
sector ministries.  They also find difficulty in making the link between gender and 
economic policy issues.  This uncertainty among finance officials is possibly the most 
significant factor in determining whether gender responsive budget initiatives become a 
sustainable process within governments. 
 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Gender Responsive Budget Initiatives: A Report on 
Commonwealth Experiences, September 2001. 
 
These conclusions are also underscored in the case of India where a preliminary attempt 
has been made to categorize the three types of expenditure – those specifically targeted to 
women, government equity and employment-based spending, general government   20
expenditures – for the 2000-2001 Budget.  In the end, such efforts are required, 
“…because the policy makers and the Finance Ministry need to realize that integration of 
gender in budgets is an economic issue rather than only a social issue (Senapaty, 2000).”   
 
One strategy for gaining legitimacy with policy makers at the highest levels, has been 
developed by women working in the government of Mauritius.  As a first step, they have 
undertaken a gender budget analysis of sectors where women have an “acceptable voice” 
– the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and 
Senior Citizen Welfare.  Calls to generate gender-disaggregated data, training in gender 
based analysis and monitoring of results may lead to broader evaluation of economic 
policies in areas not traditionally associated with gender issues. 
 
Another example of women having a voice at high levels of fiscal policy making comes 
from the UK Women’s Budget Group.  This group is composed of policy specialists, 
academics and activists representing a range of NGOs who are all outside of government.  
Until 1997 and the election of a Labour government, the group’s role was largely one of 
commenting on the gender implications of the UK annual budget through press releases 
and background briefings for opposition parties.  Since 1997, the WBG now has regular 
meetings with the Treasury in which they comment on both existing policies such as 
taxation, social security, transfers as well as raising issues of concern about future policy 
development.  The WBG claims success in influencing policy in the area of taxation such 
as the decision by the government not to tax the child benefit.  The success of the group 
rests on several conditions: 1. A group of policy experts have been available and 
interested in the gender dimensions of their area of expertise. 2. The government since 
1997 has been sympathetic to the goal of gender equality and this meant it was open to 
new approaches to realizing this goal. 3. Other groups and constituencies – not normally 
associated with lobbying for women’s issues – were supportive such as the confederation 
of small businesses.  However, the group’s character and role has also created some 
limitations: 1. Focusing on government makes the group’s claims dependent on the good 
will of government. 2. The WBG is a small group with few resources, little public 
presence since most of their activities involve discussions with Treasury officials, and are 
only accountable to themselves (Himmelweit, 2000). 
 
The UK initiative raises an important issue for greater comprehensiveness in fiscal policy 
making.  In order for women’s voices to be heard at this level of decision making, 
they must have a degree of technical proficiency to engage in debates.  Many gender 
responsive budget initiatives have a strong training component to them that equips 
women in issues of economic literacy.  There is often a key role for donors in sponsoring 
skill development workshops that build the capacity of a wide range of stakeholders to 
apply gender analysis to government budgets (for example, SIDA and Namibia).  
Developing capacities to review budgets with a gender perspective has been widely 
promoted by UNIFEM through a series of regional workshops in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and the Southern Africa region (see unifem.org/gender_budgets).  In addition, 
a series of manuals have been produced by governments and NGOs to facilitate the 
training of government officials and non-governmental organizations.  Aside from the 
material produced by the Commonwealth Secretariat (which includes a manual on How   21
to Do a Gender Sensitive Budget Analysis plus a toolkit with “how to” information), a 
number of groups outside of government have produced popular materials directed at a 
wider audience of stakeholders.   
 
The Forum for Women in Democracy in Uganda has published a popular version of the 
1998/99 National Gender Budget: “We are interested in examining and showing how 
Uganda’s budget meets the needs of poor women and men, girls and boys and to 
advocate for gender equity in resource allocations .We would like this publication to be 
read by as many people as possible especially those who would like to change the way 
public resources are allocated and utilized (Sharing the National Cake, 1999).”   The 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme has also produced 5000 copies of a popular 
booklet of findings of its gender budget exercise – Budgeting with a Gender Focus – 
which has been widely distributed to NGOs, MPs, planners, donor partners and regional 
organizations.  In Switzerland, a number of popular publications sponsored by trade 
unions and NGOs have highlighted the impact of local budgets on men and women.  
They have been effective in illustrating the gender imbalances in employment in 
government.  Recent applied gender budget analysis in France has examined 
expenditures in support of women entrepreneurs and advised increased targeting of 
funds. 
 
The South African Women’s Budget Project – an outside government initiative - has 
now published five volumes of applied gender budget analysis plus a popular version 
intended for a second-language English reader with 10 years education entitled, Money 
Matters; Women and the Government Budget (1998).  Since 1999, workshop materials 
have been developed for an even wider audience of lower levels of education.  
 
Box 11: The South African Women’s Budget    
 
South Africa has two gender responsive budget initiatives – one involves NGOs and 
parliamentarians, the other within government is led by the Ministry of Finance.  These 
initiatives illustrate the different roles of inside and outside government exercises.  For 
instance, the applied gender budget analysis internal to government is primarily for 
management and accountability: it involves government monitoring the impact of its 
fiscal policies and reporting its activities to parliament and civil society.  The outside 
government initiative involves citizens in overseeing and critiquing the budget.  In this 
sense, the civil society exercise is bringing the voices of those that are affected by fiscal 
policies but normally excluded from discussions of policy formulation, into the 
discussion.  The outside government initiative is older – it has been underway since 1996 
– and has served the dual purpose of spreading the concept of gender budget analysis and 
widening the expertise of those who can undertake such an analysis.   
 
Both exercises have used the three categories of expenditure initially developed in 
Australia by Rhonda Sharp (see Box 8).  
 
The most visible change resulting from the combination of the inside government and 
outside government initiatives in South Africa has been that government reviews of   22
sectors now incorporate a gender-sensitive analysis. One result in terms of policy change 
has been an improved targeting of expenditures within each sector.  For instance, the 
National Public Works Program undertook an evaluation in 1997 of its Community 
Based Public Works Program, which has a budget of about R 250 million out of the total 
R 350 million allocated to National Public Works.  Of those employed on the projects, 41 
per cent were women and 12 per cent were youths.  While the figure for women is lower 
than the female proportion of the population in the rural areas in which the projects 
operate, it is almost certainly higher than would have been the case without explicit 
targeting.  Unfortunately, the evaluation suggests that women were often assigned the 
more menial jobs, that their average wages were lower, that they were generally 
employed for shorter periods than men, and that they were less likely than men to receive 
training.  37 per cent of men who were employed received training, compared to 32 per 
cent of women.  The evaluation results have formed the basis of the Department’s current 
plans to fine-tune the program and further improve targeting. 
 
…One of the primary aims of the Women’ Budget Initiative is to empower 
parliamentarians to raise gender issues in relation to budgets.  But deficiencies in gender 
analysis and information are not the only constraints to parliamentarians’ ability to do 
so…At present parliamentarians have no power to amend budgets. The budget is 
presented on budget day and Parliament must either accept it as is, or reject it completely.  
Rejection is not really a feasible option in that by the time budgets are presented, the 
departments and agencies must almost immediately begin spending.  In practice, in the 
debates on the budget votes most parliamentarians say very little about the budget.   
Instead they make general points about the sector concerned…As important as 
influencing budgets is Parliament’s ability to oversee and monitor how departments 
spend their allocations...Third Women’s Budget 1998. 
 
This point highlights one of the limitations of a gender-sensitive budget initiative that is 
not placed within the Ministry of Finance or the department where budgets are drawn up.  
Nevertheless, ongoing gender responsive exercises do provide the basis for greater 
involvement of people in influencing spending and taxing decisions and monitoring their 
implementation.  Parliamentarians on the other hand, can play a significant role in 
influencing officials to make changes before budgets are drawn up.  Hence, the 
importance of “standing on two legs” – one inside and the other outside of parliament.   
 
Source: Debbie Budlender, “The Political Economy of Women’s Budgets in the South,” 




2. Transparency –of what and for whom? 
 
There is widespread agreement on the value of gender responsive budget initiatives in 
contributing to greater transparency and accountability. Greater budget transparency can 
help to identify the weaknesses and strengths of policies, can increase the legitimacy of 
governments and can create broader social alliances around difficult policy trade-offs.  A   23
prerequisite of transparency in budget systems is access to information.  For applied 
gender budget analysis, an additional requirement is the availability of data on 
spending and revenues that is gender disaggregated.  Finally, a related question is 
transparency of what?  For instance, the Singamma Sreenivasan Foundation in 
Banagalore has scrutinized one Municipality – Tumkur – and found that 99% of the 
budget is allocated to “committed works” leaving only 1% flexibility to local 
representatives.  Hence, whilst local empowerment and municipal government have 
become increasingly important, the capacity of local government to shift spending 
priorities needs to be established.   
 
In Porto Alegre, Brazil, a participatory budget initiative has been underway since 1989 
and has been replicated in approximately 100 Brazilian towns with varying success.  The 
broad goal is to increase transparency of decision-making by incorporating citizens in 
decisions about spending priorities rather than the total amounts that make up the budget.  
This may be one strategy for overcoming the fact that municipalities have limited 
resources which are earmarked for infrastructure.   
 
Another widespread problem is the lack of gender-disaggregated information and 
benchmarks.  In Latin America – where initiatives are underway in Mexico, Chile, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Equador, Peru –the absence of statistics broken down by sex and the 
lack of indicators that show a link between resources and beneficiaries, hampers applied 
gender budget analysis particularly at the municipal level (Vargas-Valente, 2001).   
 
One key issue that links transparency to credibility of commitments is the limited ability 
of gender responsive budgets to provide quantifiable measures of improvements over 
time.  In order to measure change in women’s economic and social position, indicators of 
progressive change are required (see Box 12 on initiatives within the UN system).  The 
introduction of a system of performance indicators is a vehicle for those inside 
government to assess what information is needed to monitor progress in achieving gender 
equality (UNIFEM, 2000, see chapter 3).     
 
3. Credibility of commitments 
 
Gender responsive budgeting has been developed as a tool by women to hold 
governments accountable for their commitments to women’s rights, as outlined in the 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
(CEDAW) and other international treaties and conference goals.  This then is one aspect 
of credibility of commitments: accountability of governments to the governed.  
Another aspect, frequently debated in the economic literature on budgeting, involves the 
credibility of government to markets.  Here there are many examples of how budgets 
can be manipulated by special interests such as industrial lobbyists or agricultural 
producers demanding subsidies in ways which distort the allocation of resources across 
sectors and therefore produce less meso efficiency.  For example, the quality of the 
information transmitted to market participants becomes distorted and may undermine X-
efficiency – decision-making at the level of the firm.  Also, as public choice theory 
illustrates, special interests tend to inflate the budget which may impair the stated macro   24
objectives of the government.  It may well be the case that gender responsive and pro-
poor budgets lead to more efficient outcomes at various levels of the economy by 
providing more accurate information on the impact of spending and revenue decisions.  
This can contribute to reducing gender inequality and patterns of unequal growth based 
on persistent gender gaps. 
 
i. Gender equality commitments and the distribution, use and generation of public 
resources 
 
The diversity of women’s experiences, expectations and priorities makes it difficult to 
determine exactly what constitutes progress for women.  Fortunately, human rights 
covenants beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and more 
recently, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979) as well as a series of international conventions and conferences have 
provided a basis for action (see Chapter 2, Progress of the World’s Women).  Many of 
the intergovernmental commitments to women’s progress in the economy are a direct 
result of the pressure of NGOs alarmed by worsening conditions in the North and South.  
There has been recognition that governments need to be monitored to ensure their 
accountability to these commitments.  At the same time, there is recognition that 
international, regional and national market forces undermine the ability of states to 
implement many of the policy commitments within these agreements.  This is why 
women continue to work in the wider arenas for a voice in how macroeconomic decisions 
are made.  UNIFEM is active for instance in including a gender perspective in the 2002 
UN Conference on Financing for Development (see www.unifem.org/ffd). 
 
In 1998, the city and County of San Francisco passed an ordinance to implement 
CEDAW at the local level.  To monitor its commitments, the City commissioned a 
gender analysis in three areas: Service delivery; Employment practices; and, Budget 
allocations.  The Review involved a three-step process: 
Step 1: Gathering Gender Disaggregated Data and Reports 
Step 2: Assessing the Differences between Women/Girls and Men/Boys 
Step 3: Formulating Recommendations for Action 
This process is still underway and has been undertaken in six departments so far.  Several 
preliminary findings are: the need to simplify guidelines for undertaking an applied 
gender analysis; the importance of making revised budget guidelines part of the overall 
City budget process; disaggregation for data is a problem and may hamper analysis; the 
interpretation of the data varies from analyst to analyst ( for example, who gets grants); 
and, new programs and departments seem to offer the most receptive entry point for such 
initiatives as they are in the process of setting up new data collection and evaluation 
mechanisms (www. ci.sf.ca.us/cosw). 
 
In the Philippines, international commitments such as to the Beijing Platform for Action 
have been tied to the enactment of a national law – Women in Development and Nation 
Building Act (Republic Act 7192) – which requires the systematic mobilization of 
government resources in its annual budget toward meeting gender equality objectives.  
Since 1995, the implementation of the act has required all government agencies to   25
allocate a minimum of 5 percent of their total budgets to programs and projects 
addressing women/gender concerns.  One strength of this approach is that incentives are 
being provided to officials who comply with the GAD (Gender and Development) 
Budget Policy through performance contracts and budget reallocations.  However, 
agencies remain unsure as to what should be counted as a GAD expenditure and 
currently, only about a third of 334 agencies are complying according.  This suggests the 
need for a system of performance-based budgeting where funds will be withheld for non-
compliance or fast-tracked for complying agencies. 
 
 
Box  12: Gender Mainstreaming Through Budgets in the UN System 
 
International public finance practices have gone hand-in-hand with the demand for more 
participatory budget processes.  New public expenditure management has emphasized a 
focus on establishing clear objectives, expected accomplishments, and indicators to 
measure outcomes.  This requires independent oversight by legislatures and civil society 
and greater transparency and more useful and timely data provision. The shift to results 
based planning and budgeting in many countries in recent years - including within the 
UN system  - encourages officials to recognize the utility of disaggregating expenditure 
in terms of its impact on different groups in society -such as women and the poor - and 
requires the establishment of benchmarks and indicators to measure results.   In monetary 
terms, bringing together policy goals and outcomes can result in a recognition that gender 
based analysis of budgets results in more efficient targeting of the needy and more 
equitable policies  overall (Budlender, 2000). 
 
In the case of the United Nations, a General Assembly resolution (GA 52/100) following 
the Beijing women’s conference requested that efforts be made within the UN system to 
mainstream a gender perspective in all medium-term plans and programme budgets.  A 
UN Task Force on Gender Mainstreaming in budgets was set up by the Office of the 
Special Adviser on Gender Issues in 1999 to develop tools for monitoring the progress 
toward mainstreaming a gender perspective in budgetary planning.  An overview of 53 
UN entities and in-depth case studies of ten entities, selected to be representative of the 
UN system have been undertaken so far.  Some preliminary findings are: 
 
_  Most UN entities are making a greater contribution to gender equality than is 
reflected in their programme budgets. 
_  There is no clear understanding of what gender mainstreaming within budget 
processes means. 
_  There have been significant advances in gender mainstreaming in the programme 
budget, but considerable strengthening of capacity to formulate gender-sensitive 
expected accomplishments, objectives and indicators is needed. 
_  Oversight and accountability functions were found in general to be weak, and this is a 
central problem in terms of ensuring adequate attention to gender equality goals. 
 
Capacity building involving the training of budget officers is one follow up to these 
findings.  In addition, creating mechanisms within the various entities that bring budget   26
planners, managers and gender focal points together is another goal. 
 
Source: Mainstreaming Gender Perspectives in Programme Budget ProcessesWithin 
the United Nations SystemProjects One and Two Synthesis Report, Prepared byTony 
Beck, For theUN Interagency Meeting on Women and Gender Equality Taskforce on 




Conclusions: Lessons learned for participatory budget initiatives 
 
Some of the questions posed by this paper – many still to be answered as more 
participatory initiatives gain momentum – include the following: are gender responsive 
budget initiatives useful instruments for accountability?  What types of accountability 
can they foster? How do they hold governments to account for international 
commitments and national decisions about resource allocation?  What is necessary for 
accountability?  Is there broader accountability beyond the gender budget initiative? 
What makes gender budget initiatives effective or not in terms of enhancing good 
governance (engendering decision making through increasing women’s participation and 
engendering macro policies)?  What is required for gender budget initiatives to contribute 
to the goal of good governance (strengthened capacity of governments to do gender 
analysis? 
 
Having posed these questions, what conclusions can be drawn from the evidence 
presented in this chapter?  Broader public accountability for fiscal policy in ways that are 
sensitive to the interests of poor women and men is a process still in its infancy.  The 
same is true for gender responsive budgeting.  However, some elements of what might 
constitute ‘best practice’ will probably have to include the following: 
 
1.  Participatory initiatives need to be comprehensive and address the various stages and 
dimensions of the making of macroeconomic policy generally, and fiscal and budget 
policies more specifically as macroeconomic decisions often constrain budget 
priorities in the direction of gender equality.  This requires a recognition that there is 
a gender dimension to macroeconomic objectives (Elson and Cagatay, 2000).   
 
2.  Initiatives need to enhance popular and parliamentary participation in the scrutiny of 
budgets and their implementation.  This requires user-friendly, gender-disaggregated 
information.  The use of indicators developed by previous UNDP Human 
Development Reports and UNIFEM’s Progress of the World’ Women with respect to 
gender, poverty, social development and governance can provide useful points of 
leverage for civil society and a frame of reference for governments in tracking their 
international commitments.  
 
3.  Initiatives need to be linked not only to more equitable forms of representation, but 
also coupled to training programmes to diffuse expertise and to enhance the capacity 
for effective participation by those usually marginal to representative government.    27
Expanding the pool of those with economic literacy is vital for ensuring good 
economic governance.  However, the representation and participation of people 
directly affected by different budget allocations is important in and of itself as a way 
to strengthen democracy. 
 
4.  Initiatives should be judged not only in terms of the gains that they might generate 
towards greater social and particularly gender equality, but also in terms of their 
contribution to economic efficiency and good governance.  The criterion of economic 
efficiency is particularly important when the thrust of existing practice is toward 
greater fiscal restraint. 
 
5.  All of the above require a combination of initiatives, actions and binding 
commitments at both national and international levels to produce a more credible and 
consistent set of policies – a prerequisite for gaining the confidence of both market 













Box 13:  Civil Society and Applied Budgeting 
 
Applied budget organizations may add value to budgets in seven ways.  The primary 
value added in the drafting stage may be their ability to bring new information to the 
public debate on citizen priorities and, through training, building the capacity of 
communities to take part in this process.  During the legislative stage, the contribution of 
applied budget organizations includes building budget literacy and training and analysis 
that brings pro-poor perspective to budget deliberations.  This is the stage where the 
analytical skills of applied budget groups are most evident and where their ability to 
improve budgetary decision-making is maximized.  During the implementation phase, 
budget groups may help to a limited extent in collating information on program impact.  
In addition to similar evaluation activities in the audit stage, applied budget groups may 
be able to play a bigger role in helping legislatures to monitor the impact of the official 
audit and in interpreting and disseminating the findings of the auditor-general. 
 
Warren Krafchik, Can Civil Society Add Value to Budget Decision-making?  A 
Description of Civil Society Budget work (www.internationalbudget.org). 
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